Pragmatism and Rhetoric in Libya's Policy Toward Israel by Abadi, Jacob
Pragmatism and Rhetoric in Libya's Policy Toward Israel  
by Jacob Abadi  
INTRODUCTION  
Libya belongs to a category of Arab states that have little to lose by encouraging hostility 
toward Israel. Its distance from the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict provides it with a 
large measure of security against possible Israeli reprisals. The hostility toward Israel, 
which had long been the main feature of Libya's foreign policy under Colonel Mu'amar 
al-Qaddafi, was lacking in the early years when King Idris was in power. Libya's 
connections to the West during the 1950s and 1960s had a moderating effect on its 
leadership. Although the Libyan monarchy had demonstrated sympathy to the plight of 
the Palestinian refugees, its anti-Israeli rhetoric remained restrained and it was not until 
King Idris was overthrown in September 1969 by a group of officers led by Qaddafi that 
Libya became a sworn enemy of the Jewish State. Seeking to dominate the Arab world, 
Qaddafi turned into an ardent supporter of the Palestinian people and an implacable 
enemy of the state of Israel. Qaddafi's vision of an Arab-dominated Middle East, free 
from exploitive imperialism and Western influence, left no room for a Jewish state, 
which according to Qaddafi was a mere tool in the hands of the Western powers.  
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Libya's policy toward Israel was to a 
large extent determined by Qaddafi's rivalry with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and to 
a lesser extent with Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, for the domination of the Arab 
world. Events in the Middle East have demonstrated that interstate rivalry has a 
radicalizing effect on the states involved in competition for power over the region. For 
example, this tendency became evident during the events leading to the Six-Day War of 
1967, when Egyptian President Gamal Abd el Nasser was compelled to respond to Syria's 
challenge by removing the UN Emergency Force, which separated Egypt and Israel. 
Similarly, Qaddafi regarded the Arab-Israeli conflict as an issue that could rally Arab 
public opinion behind him and provide him with the opportunity to challenge Egyptian 
leadership of the Arab world. Another argument raised in this article is that Qaddafi's 
official pronouncements did not always match his actions and his conduct was not always 
as erratic as one might be lead to believe. Qaddafi had proven that despite his hostile 
rhetoric, he was capable of dealing with Israel, when such a course of action was in 
Libya's interest. Despite the hostile declarations, which emanated from Tripoli, the 
Libyan regime showed a remarkable degree of flexibility. Although Qaddafi continued to 
champion the cause of the Palestinian people, he demonstrated his ability to readjust 
Libya's foreign policy to the needs of the time. 
Qaddafi was far less skillful than most Middle Eastern leaders who quickly reassessed 
their country's foreign policy in light of the events that occurred by the end of 1980s. Yet 
he understood the profound changes that occurred following the demise of the Soviet 
Union, which left the US as the world's only great power. However, Qaddafi found it 
extremely difficult to admit that his revolutionary scheme for a metamorphosis of the 
Middle Eastern order was no longer valid. Nor could he renounce his claim to the 
leadership of the Arab world. In the new world order that followed the demise of the 
Soviet Union, there was no room for the revolutionary ideas, which he had long been 
promoting. But for a long time Qaddafi refused to come to terms with the Jewish State, 
whose very existence stood in complete antithesis to the ideology that he promoted. 
Qaddafi sought to mend fences with the US and at the same time to maintain an image of 
a revolutionary leader. Convinced that the Israeli lobby and powerful Jewish pressure 
groups in the US were capable of helping him improve his image in Washington, Qaddafi 
found himself compelled to deal with Israel in a covert manner. At the same time, 
however, his anti-Israeli rhetoric continued, as if he was unaware of the profound 
changes that had occurred in the last decade. Consequently, his policy toward Israel 
remained characterized by inconsistency, which reinforced the impression that he was a 
mercurial leader incapable of consistent policy-making.  
BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE IDRIS ERA  
Prior to Qaddafi's rise to power, Libya maintained cordial relations with Western 
countries. The country was ruled by King Idris I, who declared Libya an independent 
state on 24 December 1951. Although Libya had a legislature, the king held most of the 
political power. His rule was autocratic while his foreign policy was conservative and 
pro-Western. Whenever the regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzen, which 
made up the Libyan state, challenged the central government the king disbanded all 
political parties. Yet the monarchy remained stable despite the domestic dissent. During 
the early 1950s, the King established closer ties with Great Britain and the US and 
allowed them to operate military bases in Libya in exchange for economic aid. Under the 
conservative regime of King Idris, Libya enjoyed cordial relations with other 
conservative governments throughout Asia and Africa. Throughout most of his reign, the 
King managed to maintain distance from the Arab-Israeli conflict and apart from 
occasional remarks regarding the tragedy that befell the Palestinian refugees, little was 
said or done regarding this matter.  
The King's pro-Western orientation raised hope in Israel that Libya would continue to 
maintain a benign attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Established in 1948, Israel 
began its arduous quest for recognition and acceptance by its neighbors. The optimists 
among the Israeli diplomats believed that once it attained its independence, Libya would 
remain distant from the Arab-Israeli conflict and possibly maintain cordial relations with 
Israel. However, officials in the Israeli Foreign Ministry were more realistic and sought 
to prevent the possibility that Libya would turn into a hostile Arab state. Therefore, when 
the future of the Italian colonies in North Africa was debated in the UN in autumn 1949, 
the Israeli delegation rejected the proposal to establish a British trusteeship in Libya. 
Israel's Ambassador to the UN Abba Eban explained the position taken by Israel. He 
wrote:  
Despite the hostility of the Arab world, Sharett and I thought that it would be 
incongruous for Israel to impose on other nations the precise form of colonial domination 
from which we had freed ourselves over a year before. We voted against the British 
trusteeship proposal, which was narrowly rejected. We had therefore taken a measure of 
responsibility for expediting the independence of an Arab state. In terms of strict 
realpolitik, this sounded quixotic, but in the atmosphere of those times, there was a 
general expectation that Israel would apply some measure of vision to its international 
policies. The columnist I.F. Stone wrote rapturously about us on October 26. It was clear 
to him that Israel was making some investment in the prospect of peace.1  
Eban admitted that Israel's decision was partially caused by anti-British sentiments. He 
added, however, that it would have looked ridiculous if Israel had chosen to recommend a 
trusteeship in Libya after fighting against British rule.2
The Israeli delegates did not delude themselves into thinking that this act of good will 
would help establish a durable friendship with Libya. An Israeli Foreign Ministry official 
commented on the Israeli vote saying, "When Israel's abstention helped frustrate the 
trusteeship plan, it did not expect to gain Libya's friendship but neither did it anticipate its 
rabid hostility."3 Indeed, expressions of solidarity with the Arab states were common in 
Libya before its independence. Demonstrations occurred in the urban areas of the former 
Italian colony during the Palestinian rebellion of 1936. Such expressions of support for 
the Palestinian cause were heard with increasing frequency after the Second World War 
and reached their climax during Israel's War of Independence in 1948. Thereafter, 
Libyans were constantly reminded of the plight of their Palestinian brethren by the Arab 
media, and particularly by the Voice of Cairo radio broadcasts. When the Cyrenaican 
Assembly discussed the issue of boycotting Israel in 1951, Israel's opponents called for a 
strict embargo on the Jewish State, and thereby silenced the moderates who favored 
neutrality on that issue. The dispute ended in the suspension of that session by the prime 
minister.4  
Libya made a far more obvious demonstration of pro-Arab solidarity in 1956, when 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and thereby alienated the Great Powers. King Idris 
attempted to maintain a moderate posture in Egypt's conflict with the Great Powers, but 
the pan-Arab pressures were too intense to ignore. Therefore, when Nasser became the 
target of attacks by the Western media, Libya's Prime Minister Mustafa Bin Halim was 
instructed to say that Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was legal and 
justified.5 Bin Halim found himself in a more serious dilemma when Great Britain 
required Israel and Egypt to withdraw from the Canal. He had to choose between loyalty 
to Great Britain whose armies liberated Libya from the Axis powers during World War 
II, and sympathy for the Arab states, which automatically associated British imperialism 
with Israel and Zionism.  
Pan-Arab pressure compelled Libya to demonstrate solidarity with Arab states in their 
efforts to isolate and boycott Israel. Therefore, in 1957 Libya imposed a strict law 
prohibiting individuals and companies from trading with Israelis and Jews. Contravening 
the law involved a punishment of between three to ten years imprisonment. The Libyan 
regime insisted all along that foreign companies trading with its companies must not call 
at any Israeli ports.6
Apart from enforcing all possible sanctions against the Jewish State, the Libyan 
government felt compelled to demonstrate sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Its official 
position on the Palestinian question became clear in spring 1965, when Libya's Prime 
Minister Hussein Mazegh stated in a radio broadcast his government's conviction that the 
creation of Israel constituted a gross injustice and a flagrant violation of human rights. He 
added that the Palestinians were entitled to return to their land and decide their own 
destiny. Moreover, he insisted that any solution to the Palestinian problem must be based 
on resolutions made by the Arab states in their summit meeting, which was held during 
that year. In a demonstration of good will toward the Palestinian cause, King Idris made a 
personal contribution of £10,000 Sterling. The Crown Prince donated 5,000 and the 
prime minister 3,000.7 However, despite this token of sympathy for the Palestinians, 
Libya's policy was not as hostile toward Israel as one might have expected. For example, 
when West Germany announced its decision to recognize Israel, the Arab states held a 
meeting in which they agreed to recall their ambassadors in Bonn; sever diplomatic ties 
with West Germany if it decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel; consider 
effective means for an economic boycott of West Germany; and to reassess relations 
between the Arab countries and any country that decided to recognize Israel. When the 
participants were asked to vote on the resolution, Libya joined Morocco and Tunisia in 
expressing reservations about the first two points. Libya did not sever its ties with Bonn, 
nor did it recall its ambassador. This response triggered a wave of demonstrations and an 
attack on the West German embassy in Benghazi. Nevertheless, the Libyan government 
persisted in its moderate policy toward West Germany. Not only did it apologize for the 
incident, but also placed guards around the building and promised to find and punish the 
perpetrators.8
Israel's swift victory during the Six-Day War forced Libya to demonstrate greater 
sympathy for the Arab states and greater hostility toward Israel. Popular pressure on the 
Libyan government to contribute to the Arab effort in order to embark on another war 
with Israel increased considerably. Libya's trade unions and students hostile to the 
monarchy attacked Jews and destroyed their property. Compelled to demonstrate greater 
hostility toward Israel, Libya joined Egypt in demanding a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from all occupied territories, without even acknowledging the basic principle that all 
states in the region had the right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries.9  
On 29 August 1967, a summit conference of the Arab leaders met in Khartoum. In 
addition to their decision not to recognize Israel, negotiate or conclude peace with it, they 
sought to raise funds for another war. While Saudi Arabia agreed to provide an annual 
contribution of £50 million and Kuwait £55 million, Libya consented to contribute £30 
million.10 Qaddafi, who was a young officer at that time, often told his comrades that he 
was deeply hurt by Arab humiliation in the Six-Day War. Ever since, he has continued to 
express his hostility toward Israel at every opportunity. He insisted that Libya's resources 
must be committed to fight with the Arabs, in order to avenge their defeat.11 However, 
after assuming power Qaddafi's rhetoric became somewhat more moderate and he rarely 
spoke about his readiness to commit his forces to a war with Israel.  
QADDAFI'S COUP AND ITS IMPACT  
The efforts to maintain cordial relations with Libya remained high on the agenda of the 
Israeli intelligence community during that time. Therefore, the overthrow of King Idris in 
September 1969 by a regime dedicated to a revolutionary cause was a source of great 
concern to the Israelis. For quite some time, the Israeli intelligence agencies, the Shin Bet 
and the Mossad, were working on a solution to the "demographic problem" in Israel. The 
fear that within a short time the higher birth-rate among the Arabs in Israel and in the 
occupied territories would result in Arab dominance over a Jewish minority led the Israeli 
intelligence community to conceive of a plan designed to pay any Arab willing to 
emigrate from Israel. A special Israeli unit was created in order to facilitate the operation. 
Phony corporations were established in Europe in order to purchase land for Arabs in 
such places as Brazil and Paraguay. These companies had also dealt with Libya for that 
purpose. Aware of the fact that a revolutionary leader was unlikely to cooperate in such a 
plan and anxious to increase the prospects of its implementation, the Israeli government 
endeavored to keep King Idris in power. According to Mossad chief Zvi Zamir, prior to 
the Libyan revolution Israeli intelligence had warned Idris and his friends in the US, 
Britain and Italy that a coup d'Žtat in Libya was imminent. As it turned out, Qaddafi 
overthrew the monarchy and the resettlement plan was removed from the Mossad's 
agenda.12
Qaddafi's assumption of power resulted in a rapid deterioration in Israeli-Libyan 
relations. The new leader immediately became the champion of the Palestinian people 
and criticized Egypt for accepting UN Resolution 242, which demanded that Israel 
withdraw from the occupied territories but recognized its right to exist within secure 
boundaries.13
Nasser's death in 1970 ushered in a new period of escalating tension in Israeli-Libyan 
relations. Qaddafi sought to succeed Nasser as the uncontested leader of the Arab 
world.14 By adopting a hostile attitude toward Israel, Qaddafi hoped to be regarded by the 
Arab masses as the only leader capable of avenging their degradation in the Six-Day 
War. Recognizing his inability to challenge Israel directly, the Libyan leader embarked 
on a campaign aimed at utilizing Libya's financial resources in an indirect campaign to 
sever Israel's ties with all its friends and allies. His main effort was directed toward small 
and poverty-stricken Third World states, which could benefit most from Libya's financial 
assistance. Thus, during the late sixties and seventies, Libya joined other Arab oil-
producing countries in providing monetary aid to African countries willing to terminate 
their diplomatic relations and commercial dealings with Israel.15 Qaddafi's plan seemed 
sinister to the Israelis, who invested in boundless efforts to gain the sympathy and 
support of the emerging African states. Indeed, Libyan aid was quite successful in 
dislodging Israeli influence in several African countries. For example, when Qaddafi 
established diplomatic relations with Chad on 23 December 1972, one of his conditions 
was that its diplomatic relations with Israel should be severed immediately. 
Consequently, Chad cut all links with Israel and expelled all its military advisors.16 
Israel's former President Chaim Herzog recalled how Qaddafi pressured Zaire's President 
Mobutu Sese Seko to stop cooperating with Israel by threatening to assassinate him, and 
how Libyan-trained terrorists from the Republic of Vanuatu in the Pacific planned to 
attack his aircraft when he returned from the Far East.17 Qaddafi continued his 
propaganda activities aimed at convincing other African states to follow Chad's example. 
He became overjoyed after the Yom Kippur War, when most African countries decided 
to sever their diplomatic relations with Israel. 
THE JEWS AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN QADDAFI'S WORLD VIEW 
Qaddafi's vision of a new Middle Eastern order under his leadership left no room for a 
Jewish state, which emerged as cancer in the heart of the Arab nation. In his view Israel 
was established by the imperialist powers. By supporting the Zionist movement the 
imperialist powers sought to create a Jewish state whose purpose was to disinherit the 
Palestinian inhabitants and to exploit the Arab masses. As Qaddafi saw it, the only 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was the total destruction of the state of Israel. In an 
interview given to Asa'd al Muqaddam of the magazine Al Usba Al Arabi, Qaddafi 
explained his reasons for wanting to liquidate Israel. He said that there was room for only 
one entity in the Middle East. The existence of two entities on the same territory was 
contradictory to the law of nature, which dictated that one must survive, while the other 
should be annihilated. According to Qaddafi, it was largely due to Arab complacency that 
the Zionists were capable of establishing a state in the region with the collaboration of the 
imperialist powers. In his view the destruction of Israel, which he regarded as an 
expression of US imperialism, could be achieved only through Arab unity.18 He held the 
Arab leaders responsible for failing to maintain a sense of unity, which could have 
prevented the imperialists from inflicting injustice on the Arab inhabitants. Instead of 
concentrating on the need to liberate Palestine, the Arab leaders became involved in petty 
squabbles and useless arguments, which dissipated the energy of the Arab nation and 
weakened its ability to resist Zionism and imperialism. He repeatedly said that the Arabs 
should be vigilant and must guard against the rapacious Zionists and their supporters. He 
warned that "the Arabs must be cautious and must not give themselves up to peace and 
relaxation." Qaddafi sought to escape the blame cast by many Jews throughout the world, 
that he was influenced by anti-Semitic ideas by reminding his critics that throughout the 
centuries Arab and Jews lived in harmony in regions dominated by Islam. He was 
particularly fond of mentioning the Arab-Jewish coexistence in medieval Spain. The 
Arabs, he said repeatedly, had respect for the "People of the Book." Qaddafi was irritated 
by those who suggested that he would have liked to see the Jews destroyed. Asked 
whether he would like to exterminate the Jews, Qaddafi said that only the Oriental Jews, 
who already inhabited the country prior to 1947, should be allowed to remain in 
Palestine. As for the European Jews, Qaddafi believed that they have no right to that 
country because they are outsiders. "We, the Arabs," he said, "did not bring anybody 
from abroad."19  
Qaddafi had strong objection to all efforts made by Israel and the Jewish communities 
throughout the world to encourage Jews to immigrate to Israel. His objection to the 
immigration of the Falashas to Israel intensified his hostility to Sudan's President Gaafar 
al Nimeiri, whose cooperation with Israel made the rescue operation possible. When 
news about the Israeli operation aimed at rescuing the Falasha Jews of Ethiopia leaked 
out in the beginning of 1985, Libya requested a special meeting of the Arab League to 
discuss the issue. Likewise, Qaddafi became quite irritated by the Soviet Union's 
improved attitude toward Israel and severely criticized President Michael Gorbachev for 
allowing Jews to immigrate to Israel.20 Rage toward Israel was always a major 
component in Qaddafi's worldview. However, what increased his hostility was not so 
much his concern for the plight of the Palestinians, but the fact that Israel's existence 
constituted an antidote to his pan-Arab scheme.  
Libya's Middle Eastern policy was largely determined by Qaddafi's personality and was 
an outcome of his desire to create a new order in which Libya would become the center. 
A barrage of insults, which emanated from Cairo, intensified his desire to prove his 
ability to lead the Arab nation. Qaddafi believed that he and not Sadat was the rightful 
successor of Nasser. Qaddafi needed a culprit on which he could blame Arab misfortune. 
Therefore, he found it convenient to denounce Israel, which symbolized an unjust 
existing order that he sought to change. For Qaddafi, supporting the Palestinian cause 
was a natural way not only to end injustice, but also to enable him to be regarded as the 
leader of a revolutionary movement. Moreover, Egypt's continued tendency to deny him 
a central role in the Middle East and Sadat's willingness to accept the Camp David 
accords, reinforced Qaddafi's refusal to soften his position toward Israel. Since the 
struggle for hegemony in the Arab world centered on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qaddafi 
could not hope to challenge Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world, unless he was willing 
to reverse the conciliatory trend adopted by Sadat. Hostility toward Israel provided 
justification for his unique role in the Middle East, and this became abundantly clear after 
the Camp David accords. Consequently, he welcomed Syria's President Hafez al Assad, 
who visited Libya in September 1979, in order to revive the "Steadfastness Front," 
established by the radical Arab states, which opposed Sadat's peace initiative. Later, 
according to Mubarak, Qaddafi offered him $5 billion in return for a promise to cancel 
the Camp David Accords.21
QADDAFI AND THE PALESTINIANS 
Qaddafi had often said that he had identified with the Palestinian cause since early 
childhood, when he was listening to the distant broadcasts of Radio Cairo. He became 
obsessed with the plight of the Palestinian people, believing that a great injustice was 
done to them. As one writer observed, "These thoughts, the injustices with which the 
Palestinians had put up with without choice, their meager existence inside the misery and 
poverty of the tents, their degradation to the humiliating status of refugees in their own 
country raked and tortured the mind of mu'Ammar."22 Therefore, he became convinced 
that Israel should be destroyed.23  
Libya's concern for the Palestinians began to manifest itself not only in Qaddafi's 
rhetoric, but also in the form of financial contribution. A special committee was 
nominated by the regime shortly before Qaddafi's rise to power to raise funds for the 
Palestinian cause, and almost immediately it managed to collect 50,000 Libyan pounds.24 
Shortly afterwards, PLO leader Yasser Arafat came to Tripoli to express his gratitude for 
Libya's generosity. In one of his interviews in March 1970, Qaddafi stated that his 
greatest ambition was to witness the liberation of Palestine.25 This, he argued, could be 
achieved only by the destruction of Israel, since no coexistence between Israel and the 
Palestinians was possible.26 After hearing about Jordan's King Hussein's campaign to 
crush the Palestinians Qaddafi said, "He is crazy. He's mad."27  
Libya's support for the Palestinians did not remain limited to declarations. It included 
military training of Palestinian warriors as well as financial support for their operations, 
such as the attack on the Israeli athletes in Munich in September 1972, and the 
subsequent attack on OPEC oil ministers. Estimates of the total amount of Libya's 
contribution to terrorism vary from $40 to $250 million a year. An Israeli intelligence 
report stated that the sum was a $1 billion. A document published by the Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) in 1982, argued that at the Baghdad Arab conference of October 1978, Libya 
promised to provide the PLO with $39.3 million a year and also offered support to 
Ahmed Jibril's organization, although Qaddafi delivered only a small part of the amount 
promised.28 Palestinians interrogated following the 1985 hijacking of the cruiser ship 
Achille Lauro, revealed that Abul Abbas who masterminded the operation was paid 
handsomely by Libya.29 An Israeli report claimed that in 1986, some 7,000 terrorists were 
being trained by foreign experts across Libya. According to Pentagon sources, Qaddafi 
maintained 34 bases used by terrorists. He paid Abu Nidal, the head of the PFLP-GC, 
between $5 million and $6 million for massacres carried out in Rome and Vienna, and an 
additional annual fee of $5 million to his group.30 Nevertheless, the Israelis regarded 
Assad, not Qaddafi, as the "mastermind" behind international terror.31
However, Qaddafi had his differences with Palestinians, particularly with the members of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation in Palestine, (PFLP-GC). They were unwilling to 
accept Arafat's leadership, and had often embarrassed Qaddafi in their operations in 
Europe and the Arab countries. Fearing that he might lose control over the activities of 
the group, the Libyan leader embarked on a campaign aimed at curtailing their activities. 
The first restrictive measure began in summer 1970, when the Libyan government 
decided to suspend the radio broadcasts of the PFLP-GC and all other Palestinian 
organizations. Moreover, it warned the group that if they continued their sabotage 
activities against the legitimate Arab regimes, their financial aid would be terminated.32  
By March 1971, the conflict between Libya and the Palestinian groups culminated in the 
arrest and the deportation of more than a hundred Palestinian workers. This incident did 
little to seriously damage Qaddafi's enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause. However, 
Qaddafi found that support for the Palestinian cause was not as popular among the 
Libyans as he hoped. By summer 1971, several offices were opened in Libya, in order to 
recruit volunteers to fight for the Palestinian cause, but the number of the volunteers 
remained so low that the Libyan leader was compelled to state that it was the example, 
not the numbers that mattered.33 His scapegoats were the members of the PFLP-GC, 
whom he blamed for frightening away many Libyans.34
Israeli efforts to hunt down Palestinian commandos led to further complications and 
embarrassments in the bilateral relations. Israeli intelligence agencies became actively 
involved in warning the Western countries of Qaddafi's aims. The pro-Western Arab 
regimes were given advance warning regarding any terrorist activity or planned 
assassination attempts by agents supported by Libya. According to one source, Israel's 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent Egypt information provided to him by the Israeli 
intelligence regarding a Libyan plot to assassinate Sadat.35 Mossad agents were actively 
monitoring Libyan airports and every aircraft suspected of carrying Palestinian terrorists 
was followed carefully. They also monitored Libyan ports in which many boats were 
loaded with weapons on their way to the PLO.36 At one point, the Israelis spotted a ship 
owned by Abu Nidal who was at the top of Israel's wanted list. In summer 1985, the 
Mossad succeeded in destroying two ships loaded with ammunitions on their way to the 
PLO. The tension mounted further on 4 February 1986, when the Israelis forced a Libyan 
aircraft to land in Ramat David air force base, near Haifa. As it turned out, however, no 
Palestinians were on board. The apologetic announcements made by Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin did little to diffuse the tension. 
Qaddafi announced that he would order his air force to intercept any aircraft flying over 
the Mediterranean in search of "Israeli terrorists."37 Yet despite his harsh rhetoric, 
Qaddafi refrained from a direct confrontation with Israel. When asked by a journalist 
whether or not he was ready to place Libya's military arsenal, including its Mirage 
aircraft at the disposal of the Arab states on the front line with Israel, the Libyan leader 
avoided commenting about his intentions.38  
By the end of the 1980s, Qaddafi had become displeased with Arafat who moderated his 
stand toward Israel. In an interview to a journalist, Qaddafi said that it was about time 
that the PLO overthrows Arafat.39 However, later Qaddafi seemed willing to reconcile 
with Arafat in order to bring unity in the Palestinian camp, and to neutralize the members 
of the PFLP-GC. Qaddafi's relations with the Palestinians were characterized by periods 
of instability followed by reconciliation. In 1995, the Libyan government expelled a large 
number of Palestinians. Qaddafi's decision was part of the protest against the Middle East 
Peace Process. Since no Arab country, including the Palestinian Authority, agreed to 
accept them, they remained in tents on the Libyan-Egyptian border and in boats in 
Cyprus harbor. Eventually, some were allowed to return to Libya and some found refuge 
in Syria. In the beginning of 1997, some Palestinians still remained in the border area.40 
Those who stayed used force to prevent Libyan officials from carrying out the 
government's plan to relocate them.41  
INCREASING BILATERAL TENSION DURING THE 1970s AND 1980s  
Israeli-Libyan relations became particularly tense in 1973. On 21 February 1973, a 
Libyan Airlines plane en route to Cairo lost its bearings and headed toward the Sinai 
peninsula, where it was shot down by an Israeli aircraft, killing 108 Libyan passengers. 
There were media speculations that Israel was enraged by Libya's unqualified support for 
the members of the Black September who were involved in the massacre of the Israeli 
athletes in Munich the year before, and therefore became prone to retaliation.42 It would 
be misleading, however, to argue that the Israelis had intentionally planned to harm 
innocent Libyan passengers. The spectacular retaliatory actions carried out by the Israelis 
throughout the years in distant areas had proven their ability to choose more appropriate 
targets. Despite Israel's explanation that the airliner was mistakenly shot down by pilots, 
who believed it to be a military aircraft on its way to destroy Israel's nuclear reactor in 
Dimona, the incident had greatly antagonized Qaddafi who vowed to retaliate.43
Relations with the other Arab states were also problematic. Shortly after the Libyan 
airlines incident, Qaddafi sought Egyptian help for his plan to sink the Queen Elizabeth 
II, which carried a group of wealthy Jews who came to celebrate Israel's Independence 
Day. Sadat dismissed the plan as too flashy and too risky and did not comply with 
Qaddafi's request to collaborate in the proposed mission. His response had an adverse 
effect on Libya's relations with Egypt. Qaddafi was even more offended when Egypt and 
Syria began coordinating joint military activities in an effort to embark on a new war 
with Israel without consulting him. Infuriated by their decision to ignore Libya, he began 
criticizing pan-Arabism, saying that it was a complete farce.44 His contempt toward the 
Arab states, which he regarded as cowards, manifested itself on numerous occasions.45  
Enraged over the fact that he was not consulted by the Arabs prior to the Yom Kippur 
War, Qaddafi criticized the direction and the objectives of the war but still supported it.46 
Libyan forces were stationed in Egypt already before the Yom Kippur War began. 
However, despite the harsh anti-Israeli rhetoric emanating from Tripoli, Libya had little 
to offer. When the Egyptian Lieutenant-General Saad el Shazly visited Egypt, prior to the 
Yom Kippur War, he was not very impressed by what he saw. He recalled in his 
memoirs, "Gaddafy's own forces were so small that they had nothing of value to us 
except Mirage III fighter bombers, and we already had these."47  
The limited results of the Yom Kippur War provided Qaddafi with an opportunity to 
criticize Syria and Egypt for their limited objectives and Jordan for not even daring to 
challenge Israel. Qaddafi described the war as no more than a cowardly attempt to alter 
the status quo. In his eyes it was a far cry from being the total war of liberation he hoped 
for. It was not so much the hatred for Israel that angered Qaddafi, but the fact that he was 
overshadowed by his rival Sadat. As Fouad Ajami explained in his celebrated book The 
Arab Predicament, "The October War might not have been the glorious achievement that 
Sadat made it out to be, but it was nonetheless an achievement. Egypt was once again a 
country with a leader, and thus Qaddafi's bid for unity could be put aside."48 When the 
ceasefire negotiations began, Qaddafi was infuriated. In a message alluding to Sadat's 
ceasefire agreement with Israel, he said that what happened at Kilometer 101 was, "a 
terrible and peculiar nightmare" to him, and that the Arabs should have maintained their 
honor by continuing the struggle against the Zionist enemy at all costs.49  
Responding to Qaddafi's rhetoric, the Israelis made firm statements, assuring him that his 
country was not immune from Israeli attacks. Particularly vocal were members of the 
Likud Party and their supporters on the fringes of the Israeli radical right-wing. For 
example, in one of his swashbuckling speeches, Sharon informed the Israelis that the IDF 
was capable of attacking any target in the Arab world, including Libya.50 Other 
politicians of the Israeli extreme right-wing went to the extent of advocating military 
action against Libya. Some even planned to attack Libyan targets overseas. In one of his 
interviews Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the extremist Kach movement, admitted that he 
planned to attack Libyan targets.51  
In an interview to Le Monde shortly after the war, Qaddafi exploited the opportunity to 
vent his anger against Sadat and Assad, who did not consult him before going to war. He 
dismissed their plan as worthless saying, "I can't take part in a war which I regard as a 
comedy." According to Qaddafi, the Arabs' main objective should not be to recover the 
territories conquered by Israel, but to liberate Palestine. He explained that participating in 
such a war was beneath his dignity and went on to say, "I will not participate in any war 
unless its objective is the expulsion of the usurpers and the return of the Jews of Europe 
to the countries whence they came . . ."52  
From Israel's viewpoint Qaddafi's attitude did not constitute a serious threat. However, 
his aid to the Palestinian radicals enraged many Israelis and sometimes caused friction 
between Israel and its Western allies. Thus for example, in autumn 1973, Arab 
commandos were reported to have had a scheme to launch a surface-to-air missile at an 
EL AL jet, which was about to take off from Leonardo Da Vinci airport in Rome. When 
the Italian authorities released the suspects and flew them to Tripoli on the grounds that 
there was no sufficient evidence to convict them, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir said 
that Italy needed a warning not to collaborate with Qaddafi.53 Also, when the Lebanese 
civil war erupted in 1975, Libya sent a force under the command of Major Hassan Kassar 
of the Libyan army. It also supplied shells to the Druze under Walid Jumbalatt's 
command. These shipments passed across the Syrian border to the Chaouf mountains. 
The PFLP-GC was also known to have received guns and ammunitions sent by Libya on 
the freighter Spyros.54  
However, what concerned the Mossad more than anything else at that time was the fact 
that Qaddafi was reported to have been striving to acquire atomic weapons. According to 
one report, he offered financial assistance to Pakistan, on condition that it would provide 
him with an atomic bomb. This is precisely what led Israel to explore the possibility of 
cooperating with India in order to destroy the Pakistani reactor.55
The tension in the bilateral relations increased further in summer 1976, when Israel 
carried out its spectacular raid on Entebbe's Airport in Uganda, in an attempt to free the 
Israeli passengers held hostage by Palestinian commandos. This event had greatly 
outraged Qaddafi. He regarded the raid as a conspiracy concocted by Israel and the US 
and in retaliation he planned to hit American targets. Both the Republican and 
Democratic conventions of that year were on his hit list; however, the recruited 
commandos refused to collaborate and the plan was abandoned.56 At the same time, 
Libya's campaign in the UN was quite acrimonious. Its representative joined Benin and 
Tanzania in sponsoring a resolution demanding that Israel compensate Uganda for all 
losses that occurred during the raid. The debate that ensued became ugly as well as 
comical. Israel's Ambassador to the UN, Chaim Herzog, recalled in his memoirs:  
As the debate continued I called the United Nations to break away from the grip of 
despots and assume its rightful role in behalf of humanity and international peace. 
Following those remarks the Libyan representative made a hysterical attack on me . . . 
Refuting the allegation that I hated Libya, I added laconically, 'Indeed, some of my best 
friends are Libyans.' The Security Council dissolved in laughter.57  
While Tunisia and Morocco responded to the raid in a moderate fashion, Qaddafi lashed 
out at the US and threatened to cut off all oil exports unless it stopped supporting Israel. 
Libya's policy toward Israel continued the same pattern of hostility during the 1980s. On 
1 September 1980, Qaddafi proposed a union with Syria and threatened to enlist as a 
fedayee in Palestine if his proposal was rejected. The Syrian government agreed and both 
sides decided to establish a democratic union against Zionism, imperialism and reaction. 
However, the plan never got off the ground. As it turned out, Israel lost ground when the 
past hostility between Libya and Egypt tapered off somewhat following Sadat's 
assassination on 6 October 1981 and Qaddafi seemed less hostile to Mubarak. 
Nevertheless, Qaddafi was carried away by the anti-Egyptian and anti-Israeli propaganda 
campaign, which he had been advocating for years. On 13 July 1982, Tripoli announced 
that it had discovered a joint Egyptian-Israeli plot to attack Libya.58 Moreover, Qaddafi 
blamed Israel for terrorizing the Arabs with its nuclear program, calling the Israeli 
nuclear plan "real terrorism."59  
Qaddafi continued to lash out at Egypt on every opportunity, particularly when he 
referred to Israel, always suggesting that the two countries were collaborating against 
Libya. In a speech commemorating Syria's 21st anniversary of the revolution, he blamed 
Egypt for signing the Camp David peace accord with Israel, saying that Egypt allowed 
the Israeli Chief of Staff to inspect the Libyan border. He asked his audience, "Who can 
guarantee that the Israeli forces would not be capable of passing through Egypt and thus 
threaten Libya?" He added, that Egypt was full of Israeli spies, whose aim was to draw a 
plan to dominate the Nile Valley. Israel, he said, was determined to divert the waters of 
the Nile into the Negev desert. Qaddafi added that Egypt adhered to the Camp David 
accord because it feared Israel and not because it benefited from the accord.60
Qaddafi had a great distaste not only for Egypt, but also for the rest of the moderate 
regimes in the Middle East, whose attitude toward Israel was less radical than his own. 
Not only did he want to assassinate Jordan's King Hussein, but he also encouraged the 
Palestinians to eliminate US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.61 In spring 1985, 
Qaddafi called upon the Arabs to conduct acts of suicide aimed at overthrowing the 
moderate regimes in the Middle East.62  
The Israelis tried to make the most out of the hostility that other nations in the regions 
harbored toward Qaddafi. By the mid 1980s, Qaddafi began meddling in Sudanese affairs 
and thus alienated Israel, which sought to reach an agreement with Nimeiri in an effort to 
rescue the Falashas.63 In his memoirs Sharon disclosed how the common hostility shared 
by Israel and Sudan brought him and Nimeiri together.64 Israel was also fully aware of 
the Libyan-Egyptian conflict and sought to capitalize on it. When Egypt's Defense 
Minister Abu Gazallah told Sharon that he was contemplating moving the Third Army 
from the Suez Canal Zone to the border with Libya, Sharon said, "I can assure you that 
we will not move one soldier from his position."65  
On 1 October 1985 the Israelis struck the PLO headquarters outside Tunis. The Israeli 
aircraft passed through the Libyan coast without being detected. This incident had 
demonstrated to Qaddafi how vulnerable Libya was to an Israeli assault. In early 1986, 
Israel intercepted a Libyan executive jet and was thus able to learn about a gathering of 
Palestinian leaders scheduled to take place in Libya on 4 February 1986. Among those 
planning to attend the meeting were George Habash, Nayif Hawatmeh, Ahmed Jibril and 
Abu Nidal who sought to obtain Qaddafi's support in order to plot against Arafat's 
moderate attitude toward Israel.66 What increased the tension even further were the 
reports that Israel had provided full support to the US during its bombing of Libya on 17 
April 1986.67 The Israelis responded to Qaddafi's accusation that Israel assisted the US 
during the raid by saying that Qaddafi could be contained only with force. On 27 April 
1986, Israel's Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir met Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister 
who informed him that his government had increased its security measures against 
terrorism; Shamir responded by saying, "Security measures are not enough." And when 
his guest asked how was it possible to convince countries such as Syria and Libya to 
desist from supporting terrorism, Shamir said, "Israel believes that the only way is a 
military strike similar to the one carried out by the Americans in Libya."68  
THE IMPACT OF NEW WORLD ORDER  
Although Qaddafi was often depicted as a hardheaded radical, he could be remarkably 
pragmatic. Despite his hostility, Qaddafi has been secretly selling oil to Israel. An 
American engineer who had knowledge of this deal revealed that many Israeli products 
and canned foods were openly sold in Libyan supermarkets. He told George Tremlett, 
"Colonel Gaddafi is always pragmatic. He never lets politics interfere with trade."69 But 
while Qaddafi was secretly trading with Israel, the anti-Israeli declarations continued in 
the Libyan media. The newspaper Al-Jamahiriya published articles critical of Israel on a 
regular basis. Thus, for example, on 19 February 1993 it called upon the Arabs to unite in 
order to prevent Israel from stealing the region's water resources. Yet Qaddafi's desire to 
avoid isolation and to maintain some measure of normalcy in his relations with the US 
convinced him that better relations with Israel could serve as a way to win Washington's 
favor. He had watched how Assad managed to improve his image in Washington's eyes 
by using the Israeli card. But as New York Times correspondent Judith Miller astutely 
observed, "Libya was not Syria, and Qaddafi was neither as shrewd nor as patient as 
Syria's Assad. And Assad was depressingly sane." And when Libyan pilgrims sent by 
Qaddafi came to Israel in 1993 and took the opportunity to denounce their hosts, the 
Israelis became disillusioned and the bilateral relations resumed their normal hostile 
course. Officials in the Israeli Foreign Ministry began to doubt Qaddafi's sincerity. Peres 
rightfully argued that "The Libyans came to us to make a good impression on 
America."70 While stating that the religious shrines were open to all faiths, Peres took the 
opportunity to denounce Libya for sponsoring terrorism and declared that Israel 
supported all measures aimed at curbing Libya's activities.71  
At a mass rally in al-Aziziyyah on 12 December 1993, Qaddafi sent an invitation to Abu 
Nidal, Ahmad Jibril, Abul Abbas, Abu Musa, Khalid al-Amlah and other Palestinian 
leaders to come and meet him. He argued that the Palestinians were evicted from their 
land while other immigrants, such as Russian Jews and Falashas from Ethiopia, were 
allowed to enter Palestine. Qaddafi added that he could not understand why it should be 
forbidden to him to meet the leaders of the Palestinian resistance, while European and 
American leaders had the right to meet with Salman Rushdie, the author of the infamous 
Satanic Verses.72 Nevertheless, by summer 1993 the Israelis sought to capitalize on 
Qaddafi's pragmatism and intensified their efforts to improve the ties with Libya. When 
news regarding Israel's efforts to mend fences with Libya triggered an angry response 
from US officials, Israel denied the veracity of these reports.73
Libya's official position remained uncompromising and the press condemned the peace 
process calling it "high treason." On 10 September 1993, Al Jamahiriya published an 
editorial in which the author stated that this step was a "new Arab catastrophe that the 
PLO leaders had kept hidden under their keffiers." He added that the PLO leaders had 
"pretended to fight for the liberation of Palestine while they waited for an opportunity to 
carry out their plots by secret negotiations at the North Pole in Norway, Paris, and 
Washington." The author predicted that "the fate of this accord will be no better than that 
of the previous accords," and that "Palestine will endanger in future generations those 
who will tear up this accord and will spit in the face of the signatories, if they are still 
alive."74 Despite this criticism, however, there were reports that Qaddafi was ready to 
announce his decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. These remarks were 
made by Adnan al-Khashoggi, a Saudi businessman close to Qaddafi, in an interview 
with the Israeli newspaper Davar.75 Several days later Israel's Police Minister hinted that 
Israel was conducting secret negotiations with Libya.76 There were even reports in early 
summer 1993 that Qaddafi was planning to visit Israel as a head of a Saudi-Libyan 
delegation.77 These reports were soon denied by Libyan sources in Cairo.78
Nevertheless, events during that summer of that year seemed promising for the future of 
the bilateral relations. Qaddafi invited Libyan Jews to visit his country. Israel's Chief 
Rabbi, Yisrael Lau, was personally invited to attend an international conference of 
spiritual leaders in Tripoli. Even more surprising was Qaddafi's statement allowing Jews 
of Libyan extraction to claim compensation for their confiscated property.79 Accustomed 
to regarding Qaddafi as their nemesis, the Israelis began wondering what were the real 
motives behind his friendly overtures. The Israelis agreed with Peres'assertion that 
Libya's motive in sending the pilgrims to Israel was part of Qaddafi's tactic aimed at 
utilizing the Israeli card in order to improved his ties with the US, which turned sour on 
21 December 1988, when two Libyans were accused of planting a bomb on Pan 
American flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.  
As it turned out, however, none of Qaddafi's good will gestures helped lead to a 
diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries. When asked by a journalist what 
would be his government's position in the coming negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians, Libya's Foreign Minister Hamid Haydar said that his government supported 
whatever the Palestinians were going to agree to.80 The optimism that prevailed in Israel 
soon dissipated after the visit by the Libyan pilgrims ended with a sour note. The pilgrims 
called for a jihad to liberate Jerusalem from Zionist occupation and the Israeli 
government was debating whether or not to deport the delegation. The newspaper Al-
Jamahiriya criticized what it called the "scramble" to recognize Israel and lamented the 
fact that the Arab Boycott against Israel, which had been so far an effective means to 
pressure Israel, could no longer be used.81  
Nevertheless, subsequent remarks made by Qaddafi did show a change of attitude. 
Qaddafi began expressing his willingness to accept the peace process. At a Middle East 
economic conference held in Casablanca in early November 1994, he asked Turkey's 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller to visit Libya on her way back to Turkey. At that meeting 
Qaddafi asked her to convey to Washington his willingness to accept the peace process 
and to turn over the two Libyans accused of planting the bomb on the Pan American jet. 
In return, Qaddafi asked that the US lift its economic sanctions on Libya, and allow the 
two suspects to be tried in a neutral country.82  
It was obvious that this change was more a result of desperation than a genuine change of 
heart, however Qaddafi had proven on more than one occasion that he is a pragmatic 
leader. It became increasingly obvious to him that his revisionist plan for a Middle East 
dominated by Libya could not materialize. In addition, the peace process had isolated 
Libya from the Arab world. Qaddafi's vision of a new order in the Middle East was in 
desperate need of a metamorphosis. Qaddafi, who bitterly opposed the Camp David 
accord, came to realize that Egypt was his only bridge to the West, and he made attempts 
to settle his differences with Mubarak. Moreover, there were reports that Qaddafi asked 
Ciller to deliver a letter to the Israelis. The latter denied the veracity of these reports and 
JANA's political reporter in Tripoli said that Libya was confident that Ciller would never 
make such a statement "because she knew the stance of the leader of the revolution 
against the Israeli enemy and about Palestine and its people and also his stance against 
imperialism."83 It remained to be seen whether these events would eventually lead to a 
milder Libyan attitude toward Israel.  
The end of the Cold War and the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue have created a 
new reality, which even Qaddafi was forced to recognize. The decision made by Morocco 
and Tunisia to normalize relations with Israel had irritated Qaddafi greatly. The Libyan 
leader was particularly critical of the mediation efforts by Morocco's King Hassan II. 
When a Moroccan economic delegation visited Israel in autumn 1993, Tripoli criticized 
the visit, saying that it constituted a violation of the Arab League's embargo on the 
Zionist enemy.84 A careful reading of the statements made by Libyan officials reveal how 
pragmatic the Libyan government was. For example, in an interview with an Egyptian 
weekly, Libya's Secretary of Information and Culture stated unequivocally that Libya 
would never recognize the "racist" state of Israel, because unlike the Palestinians, it has 
nothing to gain from such recognition.85 Given Israel's unusual technical ability and its 
contacts with Washington, one can question the veracity of the statement made by the 
minister. Whether or not this statement was genuine, it reflected a clear pragmatic trend, 
which had become a pronounced feature in Libya's recent foreign policy orientation.  
By early 1995, there were signs that some of the Arab states were willing to relax the 
boycott regulations. The Libyan government reprimanded the Arab states involved, and 
criticized what it described as a "ridiculous" rush to normalize ties with Israel, a country 
whose possession of weapons of mass destruction constituted a serious threat to Arab 
security.86  
Although the official announcements from Israel regarding Libya lacked the hostility that 
characterized the ones made by the Libyan government, the message was that Qaddafi 
could not be trusted. When the issue of allowing Libya to become a member of the UN 
Security Council was debated by its members, the Israelis expressed serious concern.87  
The verbal tension between the two countries continued into the late 1990s. Libya's 
Interior Minister Mohammad al-Hijazi accused Israel and the US of "spreading rumors 
and lies" regarding reports that claimed clashes between Libyan security forces and 
fundamentalist groups had occurred in eastern Libya. Al-Hijazi argued that all was quiet 
in Libya.88 A major source of concern for the Israelis were the reports regarding Iran's 
intention to assist Libya in developing a ballistic missile with a range of 1,250 miles. The 
Israelis learned from foreign sources that a memorandum of understanding was signed 
after a meeting between the defense ministries of both countries. The Israelis were also 
informed that Iran agreed to help Libya construct a plant for fuel and other missile 
components, and that Iranian instructors were sent to train the Libyans on all aspects of 
missile construction.89 In addition, China was reported to have agreed to assist Libya in 
building an improved version of the Nodong missile, while Libya embarked on 
developing a medium-range warhead and began purchasing missiles from North Korea.90 
According to new intelligence reports, China did not stop providing Libya with missile 
technology despite pressure from Israel and the US.91
Despite his hostile rhetoric, Qaddafi continued to trade with Israel and did not prevent 
some of his closest associates from establishing commercial ties with Israeli firms. In 
autumn 1998, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that Roger Tamraz, an oil tycoon close to 
Qaddafi, had conducted negotiations with the Israeli company Granit HaCarmel, the 
owner of most of Sonol Oil Company's shares, in order to take control of Sonol. Tamraz 
offered Granit HaCarmel $210 million in return for 56 percent of that company's shares 
in Sonol. Tamraz's connections to Qaddafi attracted the attention of both Arab and Israeli 
intelligence agencies.92 Discouraged by investigative reports that revealed Tamraz was 
involved in corruption, the Israeli company rejected the deal. Qaddafi knew all along 
about these dealings, and did not dissuade Tamraz from conducting his financial 
negotiations. Qaddafi has not only been trading with Israel covertly, he also has 
expressed his willingness to accept the peace process. However, given his previous image 
as a rabid enemy of the Jewish state, he found it quite impossible to tone down his 
rhetoric and continued to maintain a low profile in his connection with Israel.  
CONCLUSION  
This article has provided an analysis of Israeli-Libyan relations. Its main argument is that 
Libya's pro-Western orientation during the Idris era kept its foreign policy in line with 
that of moderate states such as Morocco and Tunisia. However, Qaddafi's rise to power 
ushered in an era of intense hostility toward Israel. Qaddafi used the Israeli card in order 
to promote his position as a revolutionary leader in the Arab world, and as a champion of 
the Palestinian people. Moreover, by adopting a hostile policy toward Israel, Qaddafi 
sought to win his competition with Sadat for leadership in the Arab world. The article has 
also demonstrated that despite his harsh rhetoric, Qaddafi was capable of being pragmatic 
when necessary. He did not fail to realize that the changing world order in which the 
Soviet Union had collapsed and the US remained the only global power, made it 
necessary for him to reassess his policy toward Israel. Yet he found it difficult to remain 
Israel's staunch enemy and at the same time mend fences with the US. Moreover, the 
onset of the Middle East peace process and the fact that the Palestinians themselves 
decided to negotiate with Israel reduced the intensity of his anti-Israeli statements.  
It remains to be seen whether Israeli-Libyan relations will undergo significant 
improvement. Some have argued that throughout the entire duration of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict Qaddafi had cooperated closely with Zionist and pro-Israeli groups. Responding 
to US President Ronald Reagan's call in January 1986 to boycott Libya, one observer 
noted that Zionist individuals and corporations had long been cooperating with Libya on 
major enterprises involving the exploration and the marketing of oil. He writes:  
These magnates of illegal narcotics and Libyan oil are pillars of the Zionist lobby. Edgar 
Bronfman is president of the World Jewish Congress and the former member of the 
National Commission of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Charles Bronfman 
is governor of the Jewish Agency in Israel. Both have been active in Max Fisher's Project 
Independence, while Edgar Bronfman traveled to Moscow, playing the second fiddle to 
Armand Hammer in the revived 'Trust' operation to arrange an Israeli-Soviet 
rapprochement. Let us not kid ourselves. When President Reagan called for a boycott of 
the Libyan economy, this will have to mean a boycott of these powerful Zionist lobby 
figures.93  
If these details regarding the Libyan-Zionist connection are only partially true, then 
perhaps there is a brighter future for Israeli-Libyan relations than one might expect. 
Notwithstanding the existence of such dealings, Qaddafi is not likely to upgrade his 
country's formal relations with Israel, as long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved. 
Qaddafi would be likely to maintain normal relations with Israel without giving them 
official recognition. From Qaddafi's viewpoint providing legitimacy to the existence of 
the Jewish state is tantamount to renouncing one of the main tenets of the Libyan 
revolution which he has labored so hard to promote. 
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